A central tenet of theoretical cryptography is the study of the minimal assumptions required to implement a given cryptographic primitive. One such primitive is the one-time memory (OTM), introduced by Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [CRYPTO 2008], which is a classical functionality modeled after a non-interactive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, and which is complete for one-time classical and quantum programs. It is known that secure OTMs do not exist in the standard model in both the classical and quantum settings.
Introduction
The study of theoretical cryptography is centered around the question of building cryptographic primitives secure against adversarial attacks. In order to allow a broader set of such primitives to be implemented, one often considers restricting the power of the adversary. For example, one can limit the computing power of adversaries to be polynomial bounded [Yao82, BM82] , restrict the storage of adversaries to be bounded or noisy [Mau92, CM97, DFSS05] , or make trusted setups available to honest players [Kil88, BFM88, Can01, CLOS02, IPS08, PR08, LPV09, MPR09, MPR10, MR11, KMQ11, KMPS14], to name a few. One well-known trusted setup is tamper-proof hardware [Kat07, GKR08] , which is assumed to provide a specific input-output functionality, and which can only be accessed in a "black box" fashion. The hardware can maintain a state (i.e., is stateful) and possibly carry out complex functionality, but presumably may be difficult or expensive to implement or manufacture. This leads to an interesting research direction: Building cryptography primitives using the simplest (and hence easiest and cheapest to manufacture) hardware. from the literature on quantum money [BDS18] . As far as we are aware, this family of schemes requires highly entangled states that do not satisfy the requirements of a prepare-and-measure scheme. This recent work also raises a concern about our security model involving an honest sender; this concern is addressed in Section 3.2 where we show stand-alone security against a malicious sender.
CONSTRUCTION. Our construction is inspired by Wiesner's idea for conjugate coding [Wie83] : the quantum portion of the protocols consists in n quantum states chosen uniformly at random from {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− } (note this encoding is independent of the classical bits of the OTM functionality). We then couple this n-qubit quantum state, |ψ (sometimes called the quantum key) with a classical stateless hardware token, which takes as inputs a choice bit b, together with an n-bit string y. If b = 0, the hardware token verifies that the bits of y that correspond to rectilinear (|0 or |1 , i.e., Z basis) encoded qubits of |ψ are consistent with the measurement of |ψ in the computational basis, in which case the bit s 0 is returned. If b = 1, the hardware token verifies that the bits of y that correspond to diagonal (|+ or |− , i.e., X basis) encoded qubits of |ψ are consistent with the measurement of |ψ in the diagonal basis, in which case the bit s 1 is returned. ASSUMPTION. Crucially, the hardware token is specified to accept classical input only 1 (i.e., it cannot be queried in superposition). Although this may seem a strong assumption, in Section 4.1 we show that any token which can be queried in superposition in a reversible way, cannot be used to construct a secure OTM (with respect to our setting in which the adversary is allowed to apply arbitrary quantum operations). Similar classical-input hardware has previously been considered in, e.g., [Unr13, BGS13] .
SECURITY AND INTUITION. Stand-alone security against a malicious sender is relatively straightforward to establish, since the protocol consists in a single message from the sender to the receiver, and since stand-alone security only requires simulation of the local view of the adversary.
The intuition underlying security against a malicious receiver is clear: in order for a receiver to extract a bit s b as encoded in the OTM, she must perform a complete measurement of the qubits of |ψ in order to obtain a classical key for s b (since, otherwise, she would likely fail the test as imposed by the hardware token). But such a measurement would invalidate the receiver's chance of extracting the bit s 1−b ! This is exactly the "self-destruct"-like property we require in order to implement an OTM. This intuitive notion of security was already present in Wiesner's proposal for quantum money 2 [Wie83] , and is often given a physical explanation in terms of the no-cloning theorem [WZ82] , or the Heisenberg uncertainty relation [Hei27] .
Formally, we work in the statistical (i.e., information-theoretic) setting of the quantum Universal Composability (UC) framework [Unr10] , which allows us to make strong security statements that address the composability of our protocol within others. As a proof technique, we describe a simulator, such that for any "quantum environment" wishing to interact with the OTM, the environment statistically cannot tell whether it is interacting with the ideal OTM functionality or the real OTM instance provided by our scheme. The security of this simulator requires a statement of the following form: Given access to a (randomly chosen) "quantum key" |ψ k and corresponding stateless token V k , it is highly unlikely for an adversary to successfully extract keys for both the secret bits s 0 and s 1 held by V k . We are able to show this statement for any adversary which makes a linear number of queries, by which we mean an adversary making m queries succeeds with probability at most O(2 2m−0.228n ) (for n the number of quantum key bits in |ψ k ). In other words, if the adversary makes at most m = cn queries with c < 0.114, then its probability of cheating successfully is exponentially small in n. To show this statement, we exploit the semidefinite programming-based quantum games framework of Gutoski and Watrous [GW07] to model interaction with the token. We describe this technique in Section 3.4 and provide the full details in the Appendix C.
Summarizing, we show the following.
Main Theorem (informal).
There exists a protocol Π, which together with a classical stateless token and the ability to randomly prepare single qubits in one of four pure states, implements the OTM functionality with statistical security in the UC framework against a corrupted receiver making a linear number of adaptive queries.
We leave open the question of security against a polynomial number of adaptive queries.
Further Related work. Our work contributes to the growing list of functionalities achievable with quantum information, yet unachievable classically. [WW10] . In the context of QKD, another successful technique is the use of de Finetti reductions [Ren08] (which exploit the symmetry of the scheme in order to simplify the analysis). Recently, semidefinite programming approaches have been applied to analyze security of conjugate coding [MVW13] . This is the type of approach we adopt for our proof (Section 3.4 and Appendix C), though here we work with the more general quantum games framework of Gutoski and Watrous [GW07] . Reference [PYJ + 12] has also made use of Gavinsky's [Gav12] quantum retrieval games framework.
Continuing with proof techniques, somewhat similar to [PYJ + 12], Aaronson and Christiano [AC12] have studied quantum money schemes in which one interacts with a verifier. They introduce an "inner product adversary method" to lower bound the number of queries required to break their scheme.
We remark that [PYJ + 12] and [MVW13] have studied schemes based on conjugate coding similar to ours, but in the context of quantum money. In contrast to our setting, the schemes of [PYJ + 12] and [MVW13] (for example) involve dynamically chosen random challenges from a verifier to the holder of a "quantum banknote", whereas in our work here the "challenges" are fixed (i.e., measure all qubits in the Z or X basis to obtain secret bit s 0 or s 1 , respectively), and the verifier is replaced by a stateless token.
Also, we note that prior work has achieved oblivious transfer using quantum information, together with some assumption (e.g., bit commitment [BBCS92] or bounded quantum storage [DFSS05] ). These protocols typically use an interaction phase similar to the "commit-and-open" protocol of [BBCS92] ; because we are working in the non-interactive setting, these techniques appear to be inapplicable.
Finally, Liu [Liu14a, Liu14b, Liu15] has given stand-alone secure OTMs using quantum information. In contrast to our setting, in which we allow unbounded and unrestricted quantum adversaries, Liu's results are set in the isolated-qubit model, which assumes that an adversary can perform only single-qubit operations (no entangling gates are permitted). However, in exchange for restricting the adversary, Liu is able to avoid the use of trusted setups. The security notion of OTMs by Liu is weaker than the simulation-based notion that is studied in this paper, and it is unclear whether this type of OTM is composable.
Significance. Our results show a strong separation between the classical and quantum settings, since classically, stateless tokens cannot be used to securely implement OTMs. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to combine conjugate coding with stateless hardware tokens. Moreover, while our protocol shares similarities with prior work in the setting of quantum money, building OTMs appears to be a new focus here 3 .
Our protocol has a simple implementation, fitting into the single-qubit prepare-and-measure paradigm (one needs only the ability to prepares states |0 , |1 , |+ , |− ). In addition, from a theoretical cryptographic perspective, our protocol is attractive in that its implementation requires an assumption of a stateless hardware token, which is conceivably easier and cheaper to mass produce than a stateful token.
In terms of security guarantees, we allow arbitrary operations on behalf of a malicious quantum receiver in our protocol (i.e., all operations allowed by quantum mechanics), with the adversary restricted in that the stateless token is assumed only usable as a black box. The security we obtain is statistical, with the only computational assumption being on the number of queries made to the token. Finally, our proofs are rigorous statements in the quantum UC framework, meaning our protocol can be easily composed with others proved secure in this framework (e.g., combining our results with [BGS13] 's protocol immediately yields UC-secure quantum OTPs against a dishonest receiver).
We close by remarking that our scheme is "tight" with respect to two impossibility results, both of which assume the adversary has black-box access to both the token and its inverse operation 4 . First, the assumption that the token be queried only in the computational basis cannot be relaxed: Section 4.1 shows that if the token can be queried in superposition, then an adversary in our setting can easily break any OTM scheme. Second, our scheme has the property that corresponding to each secret bit s i held by the token, there are exponentially many valid keys one can input to the token to extract s i . In Section 4.2, we show that for any "measure-and-access" OTM (i.e., an OTM in which one measures a given quantum key and uses the classical measurement result to access a token to extract data, of which our protocol is an example), a polynomial number of keys implies the ability to break the scheme with inverse polynomial probability (more generally, ∆ keys allows probability at least 1/∆ 2 of breaking the scheme).
Open Questions. While our work shows the fundamental advantage quantum information yields in a stateful to stateless reduction, it does leave a number of open questions:
1. Security against polynomially many queries. Can our security proof be strengthened to show information theoretic security against a polynomial number of queries to the token? We conjecture this to be the case, but finding a formal proof has been elusive.
2. Composable security against a malicious sender. While we show composable security against a malicious receiver, our protocol can achieve standalone security against a malicious sender. Could an adaptation of our protocol ensure composable security against a malicious sender as well?
3. Non-reversible token. Our impossibility result for quantum one-time memories with quantum queries (Section 4) assumes the adversary has access to reversible tokens; can a similar impossibility result be shown for non-reversible tokens?
4. Imperfect devices. While our prepare-and-measure scheme is technologically simple, it is still virtually unrealizable with current technology, due to the requirement of perfect quantum measurements. We leave open the question of tolerance to a small amount of noise.
Acknowledgements. We thank anonymous referees for pointing out that the impossibility result against quantum queries applies only if we model the token as a reversible process, as well as for finding an error in a prior version of this work, which erroneously claimed a reduction from the adaptive to non-adaptive case. We thank Jamie Sikora for related discussions. This material is based upon work supported by the U. Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 with preliminaries, including the ideal functionalities for an OTM and stateless token. In Section 3, we give our construction for an OTM based on a stateless hardware token; the proof ideas for security are also provided. In Section 4, we discuss "tightness" of our construction by showing two impossibility results for "relaxations" of our scheme. In the Appendix, we include the description of classical UC and quantum UC (Appendix A); Appendix B establishes notation required in the definition of stand-alone security against a malicious sender. Appendix C gives our formal security proof against a linear number of queries to the token; these results are used to finish the security proof in Section 3.) In addition, the security proof for a lemma in Section 4 can be found in Appendix D.
Preliminaries
Notation. We say two binary distributions X and Y are indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ Y, if it holds that |Pr(X n = 1) − Pr(Y n = 1)| ≤ negl(n). We define single-qubit |0 + = |0 and |1 + = |1 , so that {|0 + , |1 + } form the rectilinear basis. We also define |0 × =
. . x n ∈ {0, 1} n and
Quantum universal composition (UC) framework. We consider simulation-based security in this paper. In particular, we prove the security of our construction against a malicious receiver in the quantum universal composition (UC) framework [Unr10] . Please see Appendix A for a brief description of the classical UC [Can01] and the quantum UC [Unr10] . In the next two paragraphs, we introduce two relevant ideal functionalities of one-time memory and of stateless hardware token.
One-time memory (OTM).
The one-time memory (OTM) functionality F OTM involves two parties, the sender and the receiver, and consists of two phases, "Create" and "Execute". Please see Functionality 1 below for details; for the sake of simplicity, we have omitted the session/party identifiers as they should be implicitly clear from the context. We sometimes refer to this functionality F OTM as an OTM token.
Functionality 1 Ideal functionality F OTM .
1. Create: Upon input (s 0 , s 1 ) from the sender, with s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1}, send create to the receiver and store (s 0 , s 1 ).
2. Execute: Upon input b ∈ {0, 1} from the receiver, send s b to receiver. Delete any trace of this instance.
Stateless hardware. The original work of Katz [Kat07] introduces the ideal functionality F wrap to model stateful tokens in the UC-framework. In the ideal model, a party that wants to create a token, sends the Turing machine to F wrap . F wrap will then run the machine (keeping the state), when the designated party will ask for it. The same functionality can be adapted to model stateless tokens. It is sufficient that the functionality does not keep the state between two executions. A simplified version of the F wrap functionality as shown in [CGS08] (that is very similar to the F wrap of [Kat07] ) is described below. Note that, again for the sake of simplicity, we have omitted the session/party identifiers as they should be implicitly clear from the context. Although the environment and adversary are unbounded, we specify that stateless hardware can be queried only a polynomial number of times. This is necessary, since otherwise the hardware token model is vacuous (with unbounded queries, the entire input-output behavior of stateless hardware can be deduced, hence there is nothing left to hide).
Functionality 2 Ideal functionality F wrap . The functionality is parameterized by a polynomial p(·), and an implicit security parameter n.
1. Create: Upon input (create, M) from the sender, where M is a Turing machine, send create to the receiver and store M.
Execute:
Upon input (run, msg) from the receiver, execute M(msg) for at most p(n) steps, and let out be the response. Let out := ⊥ if M does not halt in p(n) steps. Send out to the receiver.
Feasibility of Quantum OTMs using Stateless Hardware
In this section, we present a quantum construction for one-time memories by using stateless hardware (Section 3.1). We also state our main theorem (Theorem 3.3). In Section 3.3, we describe the Simulator and prove Theorem 3.3 using the technical results of Appendix C. The intuition and techniques behind the proofs in Appendix C are sketched in Section 3.4.
Construction
We now present the OTM protocol Π in the F wrap hybrid model, between a sender P s and a receiver P r . Here the security parameter is n.
Upon receiving input (s 0 , s 1 ) from the environment where s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1}, sender P s operates as follows:
• The sender chooses uniformly random strings x ∈ R {0, 1} n and θ ∈ R {+, ×} n , and prepares |x θ . Then the sender, based on tuple (s 0 , s 1 , x, θ), prepares the program M as in Program 1.
Program 1 Program for hardware token Hardcoded values: s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ {0, 1} n , and θ ∈ {+, ×} n Inputs: y ∈ {0, 1} n and b ∈ {0, 1}, where y is a claimed measured value for the quantum register, and b the evaluator's choice bit 1. If b = 0, check that the θ = + positions return the correct bits in y according to x. If Accept, output s 0 . Otherwise output ⊥. 2. If b = 1, check that the θ = × positions return the correct bits in y according to x. If Accept, output s 1 . Otherwise output ⊥.
• The sender sends |x θ to the receiver.
• The sender sends (create, M) to functionality F wrap , and the functionality sends create to notify the receiver.
The receiver P r operates as follows: Upon input b from the environment, and |x θ from the receiver, and create notification from F wrap ,
• If b = 0, measure |x θ in the computational basis to get string y and input (run, (y, b)) into F wrap .
• If b = 1, apply H ⊗n to |x θ , then measure in the computational basis to get string y and input (run, (y, b)) into F wrap .
Return the output of F wrap to the environment. It is easy to see that the output of F wrap is s b for both b = 0 and b = 1.
Note again that the hardware token, as defined in Program 1, accepts only classical input (i.e., it cannot be queried in superposition). As mentioned earlier, relaxing this assumption yields impossibility of a secure OTM implementation (assuming the receiver also has access to the token's inverse operation), as shown in Section 4.
Stand-Alone Security Against a Malicious Sender
We note that in protocol Π of Section 3.1, once the sender prepares and sends the token, she is no longer involved (and in particular, the sender does not receive any further communication from the receiver). We call such a protocol a one-way protocol. Because of this simple structure, and because the ideal functionality F wrap also does not return any message to the sender, we can easily establish stand-alone security against a malicious sender (see Theorem 3.2). Note that this rules out a trivial construction that is pointed out in [CGLZ18] .
In order to define stand-alone security against a malicious sender (Definition 3.1), in our context, we closely follow definitions given in prior work [DNS10] . Please see Appendix B for details. Note that, instead of considering the approximate case for security, we are able to use the exact one.
Definition 3.1. An n-step quantum two-party protocol with oracle calls, Π O = (A , B, O, n) is statistically stand-alone secure against a corrupt A if for every adversaryÃ there exists a simulator S such that for every input ρ in ,
We note that Definition 3.1 is weaker than some other definitions for active security used in the literature, e.g., [DNS12] , because we ask only that the local view of the adversary be simulated.
Given the simple structure of our protocol and ideal functionality, the construction and proof of the simulator is straightforward as shown below.
Theorem 3.2. Protocol Π is statistically stand-alone secure against a corrupt sender.
Proof. Since Π consists in a single message from the sender to the receiver (together with a call to the ideal functionality for the token), we have that A = (A 1 ). Furthermore, since the ideal functionality F wrap does not return anything to the sender, there is no need for our simulator S to call an ideal functionality.
We thus build S that runs A on the input in register A 0 . When A calls the F wrap ideal functionality, the simulator does nothing. Since Π is a one-way protocol, and since the ideal functionality also does not allow communication from the receiver to the sender,
This concludes the proof.
UC-Security against a corrupt receiver
Our main theorem, which establishes security against a corrupt receiver is now stated as follows.
Theorem 3.3. Construction Π above quantum-UC-realizes F OTM in the F wrap hybrid model with statistical security against an actively-corrupted receiver making at most cn number of adaptive queries to the token, for any fixed constant c < 0.114.
To prove Theorem 3.3, we must construct and analyze an appropriate simulator, which we now proceed to do.
The simulator
In order to prove Theorem 3.3, for an adversary A that corrupts the receiver, we need to build a simulator S (having access to the OTM functionality F OTM ), such that for any unbounded environment Z, the executions in the real model and that in simulation are statistically indistinguishable. Our simulator S is given below:
The simulator emulates an internal copy of the adversary A who corrupts the receiver. The simulator emulates the communication between A and the external environment Z by forwarding the communication messages between A and Z. The simulator S needs to emulate the whole view for the adversary A. First, the simulator picks dummy inputss 0 = 0 ands 1 = 0, and randomly chooses x ∈ {0, 1} n , and θ ∈ {+, ×} n , and generates programM. Then the simulator plays the role of the sender to send |x θ to the adversary A (who controls the corrupted receiver). The simulator also emulates F wrap to notify A by sending create to indicate that the hardware is ready for queries. For each query (run, (b, y)) to F wrap from the adversary A, the simulator evaluates programM (that is created based ons 0 ,s 1 , x, θ) as in the construction, and then acts as follows:
1. If this is a rejecting input, output ⊥. 3. If this is a subsequent accepting input, output s b (as above).
Analysis
We now show that the simulation and the real model execution are statistically indistinguishable. There are two cases in an execution of the simulation which we must consider:
Case 1: In all its queries to F wrap , the accepting inputs of A have the same choice bit b. In this case, the simulation is perfectly indistinguishable. Case 2: In its queries to F wrap , A produces accepting inputs for both b = 0 and b = 1. In this case, it is possible that the simulation fails (the environment can distinguish the real model from the ideal model), since the simulator is only able to retrieve a single bit from the external OTM functionality F OTM (either corresponding to b = 0 or b = 1).
Thus, whereas in Case 1 the simulator behaves perfectly, in Case 2 it is in trouble. Fortunately, in Theorem 3.4 we show that the probability that Case 2 occurs is exponentially small in n, the number of qubits comprising |x θ , provided the number of queries to the token scales as cn for a sufficiently small fixed constant c > 0. Specifically, we show that for an arbitrary m-query strategy (i.e., any quantum strategy allowed by quantum mechanics, whether efficiently implementable or not, which queries the token at most m times), the probability of Case 2 occurring is at most O(2 2m−0.228n ).
(The constant c above thus needs to be chosen as c < 0.114.) This concludes the proof.
Security analysis for the token: Intuition
Our simulation proof showing statistical security of our Quantum OTM construction of Section 3.1 relies crucially on Theorem 3.4, stated below. As the proof of this theorem uses quantum information theoretic and semidefinite programming techniques (as opposed to cryptographic techniques), let us introduce notation in line with the formal analysis of Appendix C. With respect to the construction of Section 3.1, let us replace each two-tuple (x, θ) ∈ {0, 1} n × {+, ×} n by a single string z ∈ {0, 1} 2n , which we denote the secret key. Bits 2i and 2i + 1 of z specify the basis and value of conjugate coding qubit i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (i.e., z 2i = θ i and z 2i+1 = x i ). Also, rename the "quantum key" (or conjugate coding key) |ψ z := |x θ ∈ (C 2 ) ⊗n . Thus, the protocol begins by having the sender pick a secret key z ∈ {0, 1} 2n uniformly at random, and preparing a joint state
The first register, R, is sent to the receiver, while the second register, T, is kept by the token. (Thus, the token knows the secret key z, and hence also which |ψ z the receiver possesses.) The mixed state describing the receiver's state of knowledge at this point is given by
We can now state Theorem 3.4.
Theorem 3.4. Given a single copy of ρ R , and the ability to make m (adaptive) queries to the hardware token, the probability that an unbounded quantum adversary can force the token to output both bits s 0 and s 1 scales as O(2 2m−0.228n ).
Thus, the probability of an unbounded adversary (i.e., with the ability to apply the most general maps allowed in quantum mechanics, trace-preserving completely positive (TPCP) maps, which are not necessarily efficiently implementable) to successfully cheat using m = cn for c < 0.114 queries is exponentially small in the quantum key size, n.
The full proof of Theorem 3.4 is given in Appendix C. Let us now give the intuition behind the proof approach.
Proof intuition. The challenge in analyzing security is the additional resource the receiver (henceforth called the user) is given, the state ρ R , which the user may arbitrarily tamper with (in any manner allowed by quantum mechanics) while making queries to the token.
To prove Theorem 3.4, we model an adversary's actions as a two-party interaction between the user and token via the Gutoski-Watrous (GW) theory of quantum games [GW07] . At a high level, the GW framework can be used to model our setting via Figure 3 .4 (reproduced from Appendix C for completeness), which we now discuss. The bottom "row" of Figure 3 .4 depicts the token's actions, and the top row the user's actions. The protocol begins by imagining the token sends initial state ρ 0 = ρ R to the user via register X 1 . The user then applies an arbitrary sequence of TPCP maps Φ i to its private memory (modeled by register Z i in round i), each time sending a query to the token via register Y i . Given any such query in round i, the token applies its own TPCP map Ψ i to determine how to respond to the query. The action of Ψ i is fully determined by Program 1, and in principle all Ψ i are identical since the token is stateless (i.e., the action of the token in round i is unaffected by previous rounds {1, . . . , i − 1}). (We use the term "in principle" for the following reason. In practice, the token indeed has all Ψ i being identical. To model our security analysis in the GW framework, which allows quantum interaction, it is convenient to imagine the token keeps a history of all queries it has seen thus far, which will technically make the Ψ i distinct. What the history allows the token to do is simulate a measurement in the standard basis of any query the user sends; thus, the user can even send a quantum (i.e., superposition) query, which the token immediately measures in the standard basis to recover a classical query string. In other words, we can simulate forcing the user to make classical queries in the GW framework by exploiting the well-known principle of deferred measurement. Crucially, in our security analysis, the token does
Figure 1: A general interaction between two quantum parties.
not condition any of its future actions on this query history it maintains; this ensures the token is stateless in its behavior. See Appendix C for details.) Finally, after receiving the mth query in register Y m , we imagine the token makes a measurement (not depicted in Figure 3 .4) based on the query responses it returned; if the user managed to extract both bits s 0 and s 1 via queries, then the token "accepts", and otherwise it "rejects". (Again, here we are assuming the token keeps a history of all its responses in our security analysis; this is used only for the final measurement to judge whether the user cheated successfully, and not in the determination of any other action the token takes.)
With this high-level setup in place, the output of the GW framework is a semidefinite program, which we denote Γ:
Above, Q 1 encodes the actions of the token. The variable p denotes the "cheating probability" (i.e., the probability with which both s 0 and s 1 are extracted), subject to the constraint that operator R m+1 encodes a valid "strategy" for the user of the token. The constraints which enforce a valid "strategy" are given by Equations (5)-(9). These force the tuple (R 1 , . . . , R m+1 , P 1 , . . . , P m+1 ) to encode a ChoiJamiołkowski representation of a quantum strategy [GW07] . Let us briefly discuss the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation (details in Appendix C) and outline why such a framework might output an SDP. Recall that in round i of the protocol, the user applies TPCP map Φ i . Any TPCP map has a number of known representations, one of which is the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation [Cho75, Jam72] . An advantage of the latter is it allows a simple characterization of the trace-preserving and completely positive properties of Φ i via linear and semidefinite constraints, respectively. Reference [GW07] extends this definition of the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation from a single TPCP map Φ i to an interactive protocol with multiple such maps (Φ 1 , . . . , Φ m ); thus, intuitively one might expect such interactive strategies to also be characterized by linear and positive semidefinite constraints (i.e. by an SDP such as Γ).
Intuition for Q 1 and an upper bound on p. It remains to give intuition as to how one derives Q 1 in Γ, and how an upper bound on the optimal p is obtained. Without loss of generality, one may assume that each of the token's TPCP maps Ψ i are given by isometries A i :
(due to the Stinespring dilation theorem). (We omit the first isometry which prepares state ρ 0 in our discussion here for simplicity.) Let us denote their sequential application by a single operator A := A m · · · A 1 (note: to make the product well-defined, in Equation (16) of Appendix C, one uses tensor products with identity matrices appropriately). Then, the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation of A is given by [GW07] Tr Z m (vec (A) vec(A) † ),
where we trace out the token's private memory register Z m . (The operator vec(·) reshapes matrix A into a vector; its precise definition is given in Section C, and is not required for our discussion here.) However, since in our security analysis, we imagine the token also makes a final measurement via some POVM P = {P 0 , P 1 }, whereupon obtaining outcome P 1 the token "accepts", and upon outcome P 0 the token rejects, we require a slightly more complicated setup -Q 1 will actually be defined as [GW07]
The full derivation of Q 1 in our setting takes a few steps, and is given in Appendix C. Here, let us simply state Q 1 and give intuition:
Intuitively, each string s i b s i ∈ {0, 1} 3 encodes the response of the token given the ith query from the user; hence, the corresponding projectors in Q 1 act on spaces X 2 through X m+1 . Each string x i ∈ {0, 1} n+1 denotes the ith query sent from the user to the token, where each x i = b i y i in the notation of Program 1, i.e. b i ∈ {0, 1} is the choice bit for each query. Each such message is passed via register Y i . The states |ψ z and strings z are defined as in the beginning of Section 3.4; recall z ∈ {0, 1} 2n and |ψ z ∈ (C 2 ) ⊗n denote the secret key and corresponding quantum key, respectively. Finally, the relation X s encodes the constraint that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the tuple (x i , z) (i.e. each message to the token x i and secret key z) is consistent with the response returned by the token, s i .
Upper bounding p. To now upper bound p, our approach is to give a feasible solution R m+1 satisfying the constraints of Γ. Note that giving even a solution which attains p = 1 for all n and m is non-trivial -such a solution is given in Lemma C.2 of Appendix C.3. Here, we shall give a solution which attains p ∈ O(2 2m−0.228n ), as claimed in Theorem 3.4 (and formally proven in Theorem C.3 of Appendix C.3). Namely, we set
This satisfies constraint (5) of Γ due to the identity term I Y 1 ⊗···⊗Y m . The renormalization factor of (|S| 2 n ) −1 above ensures that tracing out all X i registers yields R 0 = 1 in constraint (7) of Γ.
We are thus reduced to choosing the minimum p such that constraint (4) is satisfied. Note that setting p = 1 will not work for large enough m for this choice of R m+1 . To see why, observe we have chosen R m+1 to align with the block-diagonal structure of Q 1 on registers X 2 , . . . , X m . Since registers Y 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Y m and X 1 of R m+1 are proportional to the identity matrix, it thus suffices to characterize the largest eigenvalue of Q 1 , λ max (Q 1 ). This is done by Lemma C.4 of Appendix C.3, which says
Combining this bound on λ max (Q 1 ) with the parameters of R m+1 above now yields the desired claim that p ∈ O(2 2m−0.228n ). We conclude that for m < 0.114n, the probability that a user of the token successfully cheats and thus that the simulation fails is exponentially small in the key size, n.
Impossibility Results
We now discuss "tightness" of our protocol with respect to impossibility results. To begin, it is easy to argue that OTMs cannot exist in the plain model (i.e., without additional assumptions) in both the classical and quantum settings: in the classical setting, impossibility holds, since software can always be copied. Quantumly, this follows by a simple rewinding argument [BGS13] . Here, we give two simple no-go results for the quantum setting which support the idea that our scheme is "tight" in terms of the minimality of the assumptions it uses. Both results assume the token is reversible, meaning the receiver can run both the token and its inverse operation. The results can be stated as:
1. A stateless token which can be queried in superposition cannot be used to securely construct an OTM (Section 4.1).
2. For measure and access schemes such as ours, in order for a stateless token to allow statistical security, it must have an exponential number of keys per secret bit (Section 4.2).
Impossibility: Tokens which can be queried in superposition
In our construction, we require that all queries to the token be classical strings, i.e., no querying in superposition is allowed. It is easy to argue via a standard rewinding argument that relaxing this requirement yields impossibility of a secure OTM, as long as access to the token's adjoint (inverse) operation is given, as we now show. Specifically, let M be a quantum OTM implemented using a hardware token. Since the token access is assumed to be reversible, we may model it as an oracle O f realizing a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m in the standard way, i.e., for all y ∈ {0, 1} n and
Now, suppose our OTM stores two secret bits s 0 and s 1 , and provides the receiver with an initial state |ψ ∈ A ⊗ B ⊗ C, where A, B, and C are the algorithm's workspace, query (i.e., input to O f ), and answer (i.e., O f 's answers) registers, respectively. By definition, an honest receiver must be able to access precisely one of s 0 or s 1 with certainty, given |ψ . Thus, for any i ∈ {0, 1}, there exists a quantum query algorithm
such that A i |ψ = |ψ AB |s i C . For any choice of i, however, this implies a malicious receiver can now classically copy s i to an external register, and then "rewind" by applying A † i to |ψ AB |s i C to recover |ψ . Applying A i for i = i to |ψ now yields the second bit i with certainty as well. We conclude that a quantum OTM which allows superposition queries to a reversible stateless token is insecure.
Remark 4.1. Above, we assumed the OTM outputs s i with certainty. The argument can be generalized to the setting in which the OTM outputs s i with probability at least 1 − for small > 0; in this case, Winter's Gentle Measurement Lemma [Win99] can be used to show that both bits can again be recovered with non-negligible probability.
Remark 4.2. Our argument crucially relies on the fact that the receiver has superposition access to the A † i operation. In certain models (e.g., software), such access is unavoidable. However, our result does not rule out the possibility that non-reversible superposition access to a token would allow for quantum OTMs.
Impossibility: Tokens with a bounded number of keys
We have observed that allowing superposition queries to the token prevents an OTM from being secure. One might next ask how simple a hardware token with classical queries can be, while still allowing a secure OTM. We now explore one such strengthening of our construction in which the token is forced to have a bounded number of keys.
To formalize this, let us define the notion of a "measure-and-access (MA)" OTM, i.e., an OTM in which given an initial state |ψ , an honest receiver applies a prescribed measurement to |ψ , and feeds the resulting classical string (i.e., key) y into the token O f to obtain s i . Our construction is an example of a MA memory in which each bit s i has an exponential number of valid keys y such that f (y) = s i . One might ask whether the construction can be strengthened such that each s i has a bounded number (e.g., a polynomial number) of keys. We now show that such a strengthening would preclude security, assuming the token is reversible.
For clarity, implicitly in our proof below, we model the oracle O f as having three possible outputs: 0, 1, or 2, where 2 is output whenever O f is fed an invalid key y. This is required for the notion of having "few" keys to make sense (i.e., there are 2 n candidate keys, and only two secret bits, each of which is supposed to have a bounded number of keys). Note that our construction indeed fits into this framework. Lemma 4.3. Let M be an MA memory with oracle O f , such that O f cannot be queried in superposition. If a secret bit s i has at most ∆ keys y i such that f (y i ) = s i , then given a single copy of |ψ , one can extract both s 0 and s 1 from M with probability at least 1/∆ 2 .
Remark 4.4. The proof is given in Appendix D. Lemma 4.3 shows that in the paradigm of measure-andaccess memories, our construction is essentially tight -in order to bound the adversary's success probability of obtaining both secret bits by an inverse exponential, we require each secret bit to have exponentially many valid keys. Second, as in the setting of superposition queries, the above proof can be generalized to the setting in which the OTM returns the correct bit s i with probability at least 1 − for small > 0. Finally, the question of whether a similar statement to Lemma 4.3 holds for a non-reversible token remains open.
A Universal Composition (UC) Framework
We consider simulation-based security. The Universal Composability (UC) framework was proposed by Canetti [Can01, Can00b] 
A.1 Classical UC Model ([Can01, Can00b])
Machines. The basic entities involved in the UC model are players P 1 , . . . , P k where k is polynomial of security parameter n, an adversary A, and an environment Z. Each entity is modeled as a interactive Turing machine (ITM), where Z could have an additional non-uniform string as advice. Each P i has identity i assigned to it, while A and Z have special identities id A := adv and id Z := env.
Protocol Execution. A protocol specifies the programs for each P i , which we denote as π = (π 1 , . . . , π k ). The execution of a protocol is coordinated by the environment Z. It starts by preparing inputs to all players, who then run their respective programs on the inputs and exchange messages of the form (id sender , id receiver , msg). A can corrupt an arbitrary set of players and control them later on. In particular, A can instruct a corrupted player sending messages to another player and also read messages that are sent to the corrupted players. During the course of execution, the environment Z also interacts with A in an arbitrary way. In the end, Z receives outputs from all the other players and generates one bit output. We use EXEC[Z, A, π] denote the distribution of the environment Z's (single-bit) output when executing protocol π with A and the P i 's.
Ideal Functionality and Dummy Protocol.
Ideal functionality F is a trusted party, modeled by an ITM again, that perfectly implements the desired multi-party computational task. We consider an "dummy protocol", denoted P F , where each party has direct communication with F, who accomplishes the desired task according to the messages received from the players. The execution of P F with environment Z and an adversary, usually called the simulator S, is defined analogous as above, in particular, S monitors the communication between corrupted parties and the ideal functionality F. Similarly, we denote Z's output distribution as EXEC[Z, S, P F ].
Definition A.1 (Classical UC-secure Emulation). We say π (classically) UC-emulates π if for any adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that for all environments Z,
We here consider that A and Z are computationally unbounded, and we call it statistical UC-security. We require the running time S is polynomial in that of A. We call this property Polynomial Simulation.
Let F be a well-formed two party functionality. [Can00b] ). Let π, π and σ be n-party protocols. Assume that π UC-emulates π . Then σ π UC-emulates σ π .
A.2 Quantum UC Model ([Unr10])
Now, we give a high-level description of quantum UC model by Unruh [Unr10] .
Quantum Machine. In the quantum UC model, all players are modeled as quantum machines. A quantum machine is a sequence of quantum circuits {M n } n∈N , for each security parameter n. M n is a completely positive trace preserving operator on space H state ⊗ H class ⊗ H quant , where H state represents the internal workspace of M n and H class and H quant represent the spaces for communication, where for convenience we divide the messages into classical and quantum parts. We allow a non-uniform quantum advice 5 to the machine of the environment Z, while all other machines are uniformly generated.
Protocol Execution. In contrast to the communication policy in classical UC model, we consider a network N which contains the space H N := H class ⊗ H quant ⊗ i H state i . Namely, each machine maintains individual internal state space, but the communication space is shared among all . We assume H class contains the message (id sender , id receiver , msg) which specifies the sender and receiver of the current message, and the receiver then processes the quantum state on H quant . Note that this communication model implicitly ensures authentication. In a protocol execution, Z is activated first, and at each round, one player applies the operation defined by its machine M n on H class ⊗ H quant ⊗ H state . In the end Z generates a one-bit output. Denote EXEC[Z, A, Π] the output distribution of Z.
Ideal Functionality. All functionalities we consider in this work are classical, i.e., the inputs and outputs are classical, and its program can be implemented by an efficient classical Turing machine. Here in the quantum UC model, the ideal functionality F is still modeled as a quantum machine for consistency, but it only applies classical operations. Namely, it measures any input message in the computational basis to get an classical bit-string, and implements the operations specified by the classical computational task.
We consider an "dummy protocol", denoted P F , where each party has direct communication with F, who accomplishes the desired task according to the messages received from the players. The execution of P F with environment Z and an adversary, usually called the simulator S, is defined analogous as above, in particular, S monitors the communication between corrupted parties and the ideal functionality F. Similarly, we denote Z's output distribution as EXEC[Z, S, P F ]. For simplicity, we also write it as EXEC[Z, S, F ]. Definition A.3 (Quantum UC-secure Emulation). We say Π quantum-UC-emulates Π if for any quantum adversary A, there exists a (quantum) simulator S such that for all quantum environments Z,
We consider here that A and Z are computationally unbounded, we call it (quantum) statistical UC-security. We require the running time S is polynomial in that of A. We call this property Polynomial Simulation.
Similarly, (quantum) computational UC-security can be defined. Let F be a well-formed two party functionality. We say Π quantum-UC-realizes F if for all quantum adversary A, there exists a (quantum) simulator S such that for all quantum environments Z,
Quantum UC-secure protocols also admit general composition:
Theorem A.4 (Quantum UC Composition Theorem [Unr10, Theorem 11]). Let Π, Π and Σ be quantum-polynomial-time protocols. Assume that Π quantum UC-emulates Π . Then Σ Π quantum UC-emulates Σ Π .
Remark A.5. Out of the two protocol parties (the sender and the receiver), we consider security only in the case of the receiver being a corrupted party. Note that we are only interested in cases where the same party is corrupted with respect to all composed protocol. Furthermore, we only consider static corruption.
B Stand-Alone Security in the case of a Malicious Sender
Here, we recall notation that is used in the analysis of two-party quantum protocol [DNS10] .
Definition B.
1. An n-step quantum two-party protocol with oracle calls, denoted Π O = (A , B, O, n) consists of:
1. input space A 0 and B 0 for parties A and B respectively.
2. memory spaces A 1 , . . . A n and B 1 , . . . B n for A and B, respectively.
3. An n-tuple of quantum operations (A 1 , . . .
4. An n-tuple of quantum operations (B 1 , . . .
5. Memory spaces A 1 , . . . , A n and B 1 , . . . , B n can be written as
is an n-turn two-party protocol, then the final state of the interaction upon input ρ in ∈ D(A 0 ⊗ B 0 ⊗ R) where R is a system of dimension dim A 0 dim B 0 , is:
(13) As in [DNS10] , we specify that an oracle O can be a communication oracle or an ideal functionality oracle.
An adversaryÃ for an honest party A in Π O = (A , B, O, n) is an n-tuple of quantum operations matching the input and outputs spaces of A . A simulator forÃ is a sequence of quantum operations (S i ) n i=1 where S i has the same input-output spaces as the maps ofÃ at step i. In addition, S has access to the ideal functionality for the protocol Π.
C Security Analysis for the Token
We now provide the technical result (Theorem 3.4) that is used to prove security of our Quantum OTM construction of Section 3.1 against a linear number of queries. The statement below is informal; to make it formal, in Section C.3 we model the user's interaction with the token via the Gutoski-Watrous framework for quantum games [GW07] . The resulting formal statement we desire, which immediately yields the informal claim below, is given in Theorem C.3. Theorem C.1 (Informal). For any stateless hardware token implemented as in Program 1, i.e., using an n-qubit conjugate coding state |x θ , and for any user of the token (restricted only by the laws of quantum mechanics, meaning using any trace-preserving completely positive maps desired, regardless of efficiency of their implementation) making m queries to the token, the probability the user successfully queries the token to extract both secret bits s 0 and s 1 is at most O(2 2m−0.228n ).
Thus, we are able to prove that if the user makes at most m = cn queries with c < 0.114, then the user's probability of cheating successfully is exponentially small in n.
The next sections show this claim, and are organized as follows. Sections C.1 and C.2 introduce notation, terminology, semidefinite programming, and the Gutoski-Watrous quantum games framework. Section C.3 shows the formal version of the claim above, namely Theorem C.3.
C.1 Notation, quantum channels, and semidefinite programming
Notation. Let X be a finite dimensional complex Hilbert space. Then, L(X ), Herm(X ), Pos(X ), and D(X ) denote the sets of linear, Hermitian, positive semidefinite, and density operators acting on X , respectively. The notation A B means A − B is positive semidefinite.
Quantum channels.
is a quantum channel if Φ is trace-preserving and completely positive (TPCP). These are the channels which map density operators to density operators. Although we will not directly make use of it here (the Gutoski-Watrous framework in Section C.2 will use the concept indirectly in our presentation), a useful representation of linear maps (or "superoperators")
The latter is defined (with respect to some choice of orthonormal basis {|i } for X ) as
The following properties of J(Φ) hold [Cho75, Jam72]: (1) Φ is completely positive if and only if J(Φ) 0, and (2) Φ is trace-preserving if and only if Tr Y (J(Φ)) = I X . In a nutshell, the Gutoski-Watrous framework generalizes this definition to interacting strategies [GW07] .
Semidefinite programs. We give a brief overview of semidefinite programs (SDPs) from the perspective of quantum information, as done e.g., in the notes of Watrous [Wat11] or [MVW13] . For further details, a standard text on convex optimization is Boyd and Vandenberghe [BV04] .
Given any 3-tuple (A, B, Φ) for operators A ∈ Herm(X ) and B ∈ Herm(Y ), and linear map Φ : L(X ) → L(Y ) mapping Hermitian operators to Hermitian operators, one can state a primal and dual semidefinite program:
where Φ * denotes the adjoint of Φ, which is the unique map satisfying Tr(
for all A ∈ L(Y ) and B ∈ L(X ). Not all SDPs have feasible solutions (i.e. a solution satisfying all constraints); in this case, we label the optimal values as −∞ for P and ∞ for D, respectively. Note also that the SDP we derive in Equation (21) will for simplicity not be written in precisely the form above, but can without loss of generality be made so.
C.2 The Gutoski-Watrous framework for quantum games
We now recall the Gutoski-Watrous (GW) framework for quantum games [GW07] , which can be used to model quantum interactions between spatially separated parties. The setup most relevant to our protocol here is depicted in Figure C .2. Here, we imagine one party, A, prepares an initial
Figure 2: A general interaction between two quantum parties.
state ρ 0 ∈ D(X 1 ⊗ W 0 ). Register X 1 is then sent to the second party (W 0 is kept as private memory), B, who applies some quantum channel
. B keeps register Z 1 as private memory, and sends Y 1 back to A, who applies channel
, and sends X 2 to B. The protocol continues for m messages back and forth, until the final operation Ψ m : L(W m ⊗ Y m ) → C, in which A performs a two-outcome measurement (specifically, a POVM P = {P 0 , P 1 }, meaning P 0 , P 1 0, P 0 + P 1 = I) in order to decide whether to reject (P 0 ) or accept (P 1 ). As done in [GW07] , we may assume without loss of generality 6 that all channels are given by linear isometries
Such maps are roughly generalizations of unitary maps to non-square matrices.) Reference [GW07] refers to (Φ 1 , . . . , Φ m ) as a strategy and (ρ 0 , Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ m ) as a co-strategy. In our setting, the former is "non-measuring", meaning it makes no final measurement after Φ m is applied, whereas the latter is "measuring", since we will apply a final measurement on space W m (not depicted in Figure C. 2).
The GW framework then gives the Choi-Jamiołkowski (CJ) representation of a strategy and (measuring) co-strategy as follows. (Recall the definition of the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation for superoperators is given in Section C.1, but the relationship between that definition and the more generalized development below for strategies/co-strategies is not a priori obvious.) CJ representation of (non-measuring) strategy. The CJ representation is given by
where
is defined as the product of the isometries A i ,
and the vec : L(S, T ) → T ⊗ S mapping is the linear extension of the map |i j| → |i |j defined on all standard basis states |i , |j .
CJ representation of (measuring) co-strategy. Let P := {P 0 , P 1 } denote a POVM with reject and accept measurement operators P 0 and P 1 , respectively. A measuring strategy which ends with a measurement with respect to POVM P replaces, for P a ∈ P, Equation (15) with
To convert this to a co-strategy, one takes the transpose of the operators defined above (with respect to the standard basis). (Note: In our use of the GW framework in Section C.3, all operators we derive will be symmetric with respect to the standard basis, and hence taking this transpose will be unnecessary.)
Optimization characterization over strategies and co-strategies. Fix any Q a from a measuring co-strategy {Q 0 , Q 1 }, as in Equation (17). Then, the maximum probability with which a (nonmeasuring) strategy can force the co-strategy to output result a is given by min: p
subject to: Q a pR m
C.3 Security against a linear number of token queries
To show security of our hardware token implementation (Program 1) against a linear number of queries, we now model a user's interaction with the token as an interactive game between two parties using the GW framework of Section C.2. We shall treat the token as the co-strategy and the user as the strategy.
We proceed as follows. As depicted in Figure C .2, the token (co-strategy) begins by preparing state ρ 0 ∈ L(X 1 ⊗ W 0 ), and sending message X 1 to the user. The user then makes m queries, each via a distinct register Y i for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. For each query made, we model the token as returning two strings: (1) a symbol in set Σ = 0, 1, 0, 1 where 0 and 1 denote successful 0-and 1-queries, respectively, and 0 and 1 denote unsuccessful 0-and 1-queries, respectively, and (2) a bit b which is set to 0 for a failed query, or secret bit b i for a successful i-query. Formally, the size of each register X i for i ≥ 2 is hence three qubits. We will deviate from Figure C .2 in one respect -we assume the token returns the response to query m as well via a register Y m+1 ; this does not affect the success or failure of the user (as the latter makes no further queries at this point), but helps streamline the analysis. After this last response is sent out, the token measures the string s ∈ Σ m of responses it sent back to the user, and "accepts" if and only if s contains at least one 0 and one 1. (More on this history of responses kept by the token and how to maintain the stateless property of the token to come.)
Let us next introduce the terminology used in this section for discussing the secret key held by the token. Namely, recall in Program 1 that the token keeps secret key data x ∈ {0, 1} n and θ ∈ {+, ×} n . Here, we shall replace these by a single string z ∈ {0, 1} 2n , such that bits 2i and 2i + 1 of z specify the basis and value of conjugate coding qubit i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (i.e. z 2i = θ i and z 2i+1 = x i ). We shall call z the secret key. For consistency, we shall rename the quantum key |x θ from Program 1 by |ψ z ∈ (C 2 ) ⊗n , i.e. |x θ = |ψ z . Next, in Program 1 the token takes inputs b ∈ {0, 1} and y ∈ {0, 1} n , for b the choice bit and y the claimed measured value. In this section, we shall simply concatenate these as one string x = by ∈ {0, 1} n+1 , the first bit of which is the choice bit.
We shall refer to x as a query string. With these definitions in hand, for each secret key z ∈ {0, 1} 2n ,
, which correspond to the sets of query strings x which cause the token to return response 0, 1, 0, or 1, respectively. We can now begin to set up the GW framework. To define linear isometries A k , we first construct
for k ∈ {1, . . . , m} as follows:
Above, recall the register Y k denotes the kth message sent by the user to the token, X k the kth response sent by the token back to the user (the first symbol of which denotes accept/reject via a symbol from Σ, and the second symbol of which is the corresponding secret bit, which is set to 0 by default for failed queries), and W k denotes the private memory of the token, which we now discuss further.
Let us now elaborate on how the token's private memory spaces W k is modelled. First, W 0 contains the secret key z ∈ {0, 1} 2n of the token. Then, each W k register for k > 0 is split into k + 1 parts: W k,1 contains a copy of z (this allows us to pass forward z from one round of interaction to the next), and W k,r for r ≥ 2 contains a copy in the standard basis of the user's (r − 1)st query string, as well as the token's response from Σ. These copies are kept for two reasons. First, it simulates measuring each message from the user in the standard basis 7 , as required by the token. Second, keeping x ensures ∆ k (z) † ∆ k (z) = I, so that each A i defined shortly is an isometry. Note that, crucially, the contents of W k,r for r ≥ 2 are never accessed again 8 by the token in any future iteration (this is the definition of the token being stateless, and is formally captured by the definition of the terms A i shortly). Also, while the size of W grows with m in our security analysis here, the actual token does not have growing memory requirements since it simply discards the results of each measurement of the user's message once it returns a symbol from Σ in each round of communication.
We can now define isometries A i (intuition to follow) for round i of the token's actions, where 1 < k ≤ m:
Here, A 0 : C → X 1 ⊗ W 0 , and
Intuitively, the isometry A 0 captures the token choosing an initial secret key z uniformly at random and preparing corresponding quantum key |ψ z , which it sends to the user. Each A i for 1 ≤ k ≤ m captures the token reading a message from the user in Y k and measuring it in the standard basis (simulated by copying string x to a private register W k,k+1 ), and returning an appropriate response to the user in register X k+1 (note this response depends only on the contents of Y k , i.e., on the kth message, since the token is stateless). It also stores a copy of the kth response from Σ to the user in the private register W k,k+1 ; as mentioned before, this information is not accessed by the token in deciding any future messages X k+i , but is used in our analysis to define the accepting measurement P 1 . Having defined isometries A i , their product now yields operator A from Equation (16) (where we reorder the X and W registers to clarify that incoming message Y k results in outgoing message X k+1 ):
Normally, the GW framework allows quantum messages to be exchanged between parties, but in our setting the token only accepts classical query strings. To force the user to send classical strings, the token can simulate measurement of the user's query qubits by simply creating a "local copy" of said qubits via local controlled-NOT gates, i.e. the token employs the principle of deferred measurement. 8 Strictly speaking, as mentioned earlier, this is not quite accurate -the contents of W k,r are accessed during the final measurement made by the token in determining whether the user succeeded in cheating. This, however, is just a technical construct for our analysis, which allows us to formalize what it means for the user to "successfully cheat". The final measurement does not affect any of the token's previous responses X i , thus maintaining the stateless property of the token. For clarity, in the actual protocol itself, the token does not keep any private memory, and makes no "final" measurement as done in our analysis.
where A(x, z) ∈ Σ denotes whether the token accepted or rejected query string x assuming secret key z, and b A(x,z) ∈ {0, 1} is the secret bit returned by the token corresponding to A(x, z) ∈ Σ.
In order to next define operator Q 1 from Equation (17), we model what it means for a cheating user of the token to "succeed". As mentioned earlier, this is formalized by having the token make a final measurement after the protocol concludes, in order to determine whether the user has successfully extracted both secret bits via queries. Formally, for convenience, let W denote the tensor product of the registers in W m,r for 2 ≤ r ≤ m + 1 which hold the values from Σ (i.e., which hold terms A(x r−1 , z)). Then, a successful user makes at least one correct 0 query and at least one correct 1 query. Our accepting measurement operator P 1 , which corresponds to a successful user, is thus defined as follows. P 1 maps W to itself, and is a projector onto the set of strings with some i = j such that W i is set to |0 and W j is set to |1 . In other words, P 1 projects onto set S := {s ∈ Σ m | s contains at least one 0 and one 1}.
To now use this definition of P 1 to write down B 1 , we first need further terminology. Define for any s ∈ S and fixed key z ∈ {0, 1} 2n , the set of all consistent sequences of query strings x i ∈ {0, 1} n+1 as:
the ith block of (n + 1) bits in x .
(For clarity and as an example, the second block of (n + 1) bits of 0 n+1 1 n+1 is 1 n+1 .) Finally, define
In words, a triple (s, x, z) ∈ R if for a secret key z and query string x, s ∈ Σ m is the (unique) correct response string from the token. With these definitions in place, we can finally define B 1 = (
Thus,
Proof. Recall from Equation (20) that
where s ⊆ Σ m and b ∈ {0, 1} m are the resulting query responses and secret bits, respectively.
Observe that any fixed x ∈ {0, 1} m(n+1) and z ∈ {0, 1} 2n determine a unique query response string s ∈ Σ m ; denote this as s(x, z). Therefore,
for S ⊆ Σ m defined as in Equation (19). Let us drop the constraint that s(x, z) ∈ S, i.e. choose
Clearly, Q 1 p · R m+1 for p = 1, since we added positive semidefinite terms to Q 1 to get R m+1 . Thus, if R m+1 satisfies the remaining primal constraints, then it has objective function value p = 1.
To see that R m+1 satisfies the primal constraints, clearly Q m+1 has I in register Y m+1 (recall Y m+1 = C, so this just means Y m+1 is trivially set to 1). Let us now trace out X m+1 ; we require that register Y m−1 now also contains the identity. For this, Tr X m+1 (R m+1 ) equals:
where for brevity we use s m−1 (x, z)b m−1 to denote the first m − 1 queries. But since we discarded the mth symbol of s(x, z), registers Y m and X 1 are now independent. Thus, bringing in the sum over Finally, tracing out X 1 yields I Y m···1 , since there are 4 n possible quantum key states |ψ z . Hence, R m+1 is a feasible solution.
An upper bound on the cheating probability. We now give a feasible solution to SDP Γ which yields the claimed security against a linear number of queries. Its proof of correctness relies on Lemma C.4, stated and proven subsequently.
Theorem C.3. The SDP Γ has a feasible solution with p ∈ O(2 2m−0.228n ).
first bit of x m is 1. In words, we are modelling m − 1 successful (and identical) 0-queries in the Z-basis, followed by a single successful 1-query in the X-basis. The question now is: Given s and x, how many |ψ z ∈ (C 2 ) ⊗n exist such that (s, x, z) ∈ R? To answer this, observe that the token enforces the following set of rules. Fix any i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and let |x i (j) and |ψ z (j) denote the jth qubits of x i and ψ z , respectively. Then we have rules (where H denotes the 2 × 2 Hadamard matrix, and b denotes the complement of bit b):
1. If s i = 0, then ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either |ψ z (j) = |x i (j) or |ψ z (j) ∈ {|+ , |− }.
2. If s i = 1, then ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either |ψ z (j) = H|x i (j) or |ψ z (j) ∈ {|0 , |1 }. 3 . If s i = 0, then ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that |ψ z (j) = |x i (j) . 4. If s i = 1, then ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that |ψ z (j) = H|x i (j) .
Recall now that we set s 1 = 0 and s m = 1, i.e. the first query was a successful Z-basis query and the last query was a successful X-basis query. Applying rules 1 and 2 above thus yields that for all indices k, |ψ z (k) ∈ {|x 1 (k) , H|x m (k) }. Moreover, since x 1 = x 2 = · · · = x m−1 , it follows that for all k, both assignments for |ψ z (k) are consistent for |ψ z (k) . We conclude that the (s, ) n among all (s, x)-blocks. For any s ∈ S, there exist indices i = j such that x i and x j are a successful 0-and 1-query, respectively. Without loss of generality, assume i = j = 1. Then, as in the previous case, rules 1 and 2 imply that: ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |ψ z (k) ∈ {|x 1 (k) , H|x m (k) }.
Consider now any x i for 1 < i < m, and suppose without loss of generality that x i is a 0-query, i.e. its first bit is set to 0. There are two cases to analyze:
• (Case 1: s i = 0) In this case, both query 1 and query i are successful 0-queries; thus, they must agree on all secret key bits which were encoded in the Z basis. It follows from Rule 1 that for any bit k on which x 1 and x i disagree, the secret key must have encoded bit k in the X-basis. In other words, |ψ z (k) = H|x m (k) in Equation (23) (i.e. one of the two possibilities is eliminated). (If x 1 = x i , on the other hand, no such additional constraint exists.)
• (Case 2: s i = 0) In this case, query i is an unsuccessful 0-query. By Rule 3, there exists a bit k on which x 1 and x k disagree, and whose corresponding secret key bit was encoded in the Z basis. In other words, |ψ z (k) = |x 1 (k) in Equation (23) (i.e., one of the two possibilities is eliminated).
The analysis for x i being a 1-query is analogous. We conclude that for any (s, x)-block of Q 1 , the operator in register X 1 is of the form of σ from Equation (22), except that the some of the indices k may contain an operator consisting of only 1 summand (e.g. |x 1 (k) x 1 (k)| instead of |x 1 (k) x 1 (k)| + H|x m (k) x m (k)|H). Since the omitted summands are all positive semidefinite, however, we conclude the eigenvalue on any (s, x)-block is at most the eigenvalue of σ from Equation (22) ) n , as claimed.
D Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. Observe first that an honest receiver Alice wishing to extract s i acts as follows. She applies a unitary U i ∈ U (A ⊗ B) to get state |φ 1 := U i |ψ AB |0 C .
She then measures B in the computational basis and postselects on result y ∈ {0, 1} n , obtaining state |φ 2 := |φ y A |y B |0 C .
She now treats y as a "key" for s i , i.e., she applies O f to B ⊗ C to obtain her desired bit s i , i.e., |φ 3 := |φ y A |y B |s i C .
A malicious receiver Bob wishing to extract s 0 and s 1 now acts similarly to the rewinding strategy for superposition queries. Suppose without loss of generality that s 0 has at most ∆ keys. Then, Bob first applies U 0 to prepare |φ 1 from Equation (24), which we can express as |φ 1 = ∑ y∈{0,1} n α y |ψ y A |y B |0 C .
for ∑ y α y 2 = 1. Since measuring B next would allow us to retrieve s 0 in register C with certainty,
we have that all y appearing in the expansion above satisfy f (y) = s i . Moreover, since s 0 has at most ∆ keys, there exists a key y such that α y 2 ≥ 1/∆. Bob now measures B in the computational basis to obtain |φ 2 from Equation (25), obtaining y with probability at least 1/∆. Feeding y into O f yields s 1 . Having obtained y , we have that | φ 1 |φ 2 | 2 ≥ 1/∆, implying
i.e., Bob now applies U † 0 to recover a state with "large" overlap with initial state |ψ . To next recover s 1 , define |ψ good := U 1 |ψ and |ψ approx := U 1 U † 0 |φ y |y . Bob applies U 1 to obtain |ψ approx = β 1 |ψ good + β 2 |ψ
where ∑ i |β i | 2 = 1, ψ good |ψ ⊥ good = 0, and |β 1 | 2 ≥ 1/∆. Define Π good := ∑ y∈{0,1} n s.t. f (y)=s 1 |y y|. Then, the probability that measuring B in the computational basis now yields a valid key for s 1 is
where we have used the fact that Π good |ψ good = |ψ good (since an honest receiver can extract s 1 with certainty). We conclude that Bob can extract both s 0 and s 1 with probability at least 1/∆ 2 .
